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ISSN : 2288-4637(Print)
ISSN : 2288-4645(Online)
The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business Vol.6 No.1 pp.281-288

R&D Intensity and Regulation Fair Disclosure

Jin-Ha Park1, Hoshik Shim2
1 First Author, Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, Soongsil University, South Korea, E-mail:
2 Corresponding Author, Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, Kookmin University, South Korea [Postal Address: College of Business Administration, Room 410, Jeongneung-ro 77, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 02707, South Korea] Tel: +82-2-910-5658, E-mail:
November 21, 2018 December 10, 2018 January 10, 2019


This study examines the relationship between R&D intensity and disclosure. R&D activities are essential in bringing innovation to companies. However, R&D activities are naturally uncertain and increase information asymmetry. Thus, firms with high R&D activities are more likely to have the incentive to communicate the potential of R&D investment to the market through voluntary disclosure and, concurrently, resolve information asymmetry. Meanwhile, incentives to less voluntary disclosure exist because of the proprietary cost and the risk of competitiveness loss. Furthermore, the uncertainties inherent in R&D activities caused the possible decrease in the information accuracy. For the two opposing views, this study investigates the relationship between R&D intensity and disclosure frequency using the Regulation Fair Disclosure data in Korea. Moreover, the relationship between R&D intensity and usefulness of the information disclosed is also examined. Using firm sample listed in the 2011–2016 Korea Stock Market, results show that firms with high R&D intensity make disclosures more frequent. Subsequently, the analysis using forecast sample shows that management forecast error is higher in firms with high R&D intensity. This research contributes to the existing literature by presenting evidence that R&D intensity is a significant factor affecting manager's disclosure behavior and information usefulness.

JEL Classification Code: O32, M14, M41.






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